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ABSTRACT
THE ROLE OF EXPERffiNCE IN INFANTS' REPRESENTATIONS
OF UNSEEN, SOUNDING OBJECTS
SEPTEMBER 1999
MONICA R. SYLVIA, B.A., FAIRFIELD UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rachel K. Clifton
The purpose of the current study was to investigate the role of representations in
infants' reaching toward sounding objects in the dark. Infants were divided into two
groups, a silent-object and a sound-experience group, and were allowed to reach for and
manipulate a toy in the light. For infants in the silent-object group, the toy remained
completely silent whereas for infants in the sound-experience group, the same toy began
to produce a doorbell sound once they had reached for and were manipulating it. Infants
in both groups then were presented with this sound in the dark and their reaching
behavior was observed.
The frequency rate of infants' reaches in the dark was affected by their
experience with the sounding toy in the light. Infants who were given the opportunity to
associate the doorbell sound with the toy in the light (i.e. infants in the sound-experience
group) reached during more of the dark trials than infants who were not given this
opportunity (i.e. infants in the silent-object group). This result supports the
representation hypothesis, which suggests that infants reach toward sounds presented to
them in the dark based on their representations of the objects associated with those
vi
sounds. More importantly, this result lends support to the primary conclusion drawn
from the results of previous reaching in the dark studies, namely, that infants as young
6 Vi months can form and utilize representations to guide their behavior toward objects
when those objects are no longer visible.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What Are Representations?
Everyday, we rely on representations to help us reason about objects and events
the world. For example, when giving directions to the nearest gas station, we might
"imagine" traveling along the route as we describe it. In another case, when navigating
through a darkened room during a mid-night power outage, we might "picture" the layout
of the room, the location of furniture relative to where we are standing, the approximate
size and shape of that furniture, etc. In both instances, one might argue that we relied on
our representations of objects and events to solve the problems at hand. Yet while
scenarios such as these help us to think about the various contexts in which we might use
representations, they do not clearly define them. The question remains, "What exactly
are representations?".
Numerous attempts have been made at defining representations and identifying
their role in cognition. For instance, Stillings (1995) referred to Marr's definition of
representational systems as formal systems for making explicit certain entities or types of
information. Based on this, he defined representations as sets of symbols and rules for
relating them to actual objects and events in the world. In this light, representations may
include abstract symbols, words, statements, and/or images, as well as our ability to make
these entities correspond to reality. According to this definition, symbols, words, and/or
images may have comprised the representations on which we relied in the above
scenarios. More importantly, however, these representations must have involved a
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correspondence between these symbols, words, and/or images and the actual route to the
nearest gas station and placement of the furniture itself.
While the definition offered by Stillings (1995) emphasizes the correspondence
between representations and reality, alternative definitions revolve around the role that
representations play in cognition. According to Rumelhart and Norman (1988),
representations are those mental activities that allow us to reach conclusions about
objects and events in the world in the absence of those objects and events themselves.
Similarly, Mandler (1998) defined representations as stored pieces of information which
come to influence our behavior. According to these definitions, the representations
utilized in the previous scenario of giving directions to the nearest gas station once again
may have consisted of symbols, words, and/or images that allowed us to reason about the
route that we described. For instance, these representations may have enabled us to
provide landmarks, to estimate the distances between them, and to reason about the order
in which they occur without actually having to travel the route ourselves. Likewise,
representations would have been those symbols, words, and/or images that allowed us to
reason about the probable location of the furniture in the darkened room and adjust our
behavior accordingly without actually being able to see the furniture itself.
A final definition of representations formulated by Piaget and described by
Mandler (1988) emphasizes the key component of representations alluded to by both
Rumelhart and Norman (1988) and Mandler (1998), namely, that they exist in the
absence of direct, perceptual information. As Mandler (1988) pointed out, the "evocation
of absent objects and events" lies at the heart of Piaget' s definition of representations (p.
122). Based on his definition, she suggested that representations revolve around one's
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ability to "re-present to the conscious mind" a previously experienced object or event in
the absence of on-going perceptual support (Mandler, 1988, p. 122). Like the one
proposed by Stillings (1995), this definition necessitates the existence of images or
symbols to refer to absent objects and events, as well as a system by which these images
and symbols can be related to reality.
Overall, each of the definitions offered here share two important distinctions,
namely, those between the "represented" versus the 'representing world" and
"descriptions" versus representations. As Rumelhart and Norman (1988) pointed out, the
represented world is the physical environment around us. The representing world, on the
other hand, refers to how we portray that environment in our thinking and reasoning. As
Rumelhart and Norman suggested, we select various aspects of the represented world to
map; the entities in our thinking and reasoning which correspond to these selected
aspects constitute representations and are part of the representing world. Embedded in
this distinction is one between descriptions and representations. As Stillings (1995)
suggested, a description is a symbol for a given entity that gets its value from the role it
plays in the system of representation. In contrast, a representation is the information
behind that symbol. For example, in the darkened room scenario previously described,
the actual furniture itself would be part of the represented world, where as our image of a
given piece of furniture (i.e. its shape, location, size, etc.) would be part of our
representing world. Furthermore, this image would be considered a symbol that
describes our representation of the actual piece of furniture itself.
Taken together, the various definitions of representations discussed here provide a
basis for answering our initial question, "What exactly are representations?". It is clear
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from the definitions just presented that there are essentially two criteria that must be met
in order for something to be considered a representation. First of all, a representation
must involve stored information regarding an object or event which has been perceived
or experienced previously that is evoked in the absence of that object or event itself.
Secondly, that information must provide a means by which one can reason or draw
conclusions about that object or event and/or guide his/her future actions and behavior.
Tvpes of Representational Svstems
As the definitions provided by Stillings (1995), Rumelhart and Norman (1988),
and Mandler ( 1988, 1998) all suggest, representations can exist in a variety of formats.
For example, propositional representations involve sets of symbols or propositions about
certain entities in the represented world (Rumelhart & Norman). Likewise, the symbolic
system of representation described by Mandler (1998) uses formal propositions or
statements to represent objects and events. As she described it, representations in this
system usually are couched in language, with words representing objects, events, etc. In
this light, propositional and symbolic representations are most in line with the definition
offered by Stillings because they involve formal systems of symbols or propositions that
necessitate rules for relating them to reality.
As Mandler (1998) pointed out, several problems exist with the way information
is depicted in propositional and symbolic representational systems. For example, she
maintained that these systems cannot describe sensorimotor information adequately
because it is difficult to specify such information with words or symbols. In addition,
Mandler asserted that these systems cannot account for learning from birth since the
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systems of language and symbols used to represent objects and events first must be
learned before information can be represented.
In light of the problems just mentioned, Mandler (1998), along with others (e.g.
Rumelhart & Norman, 1988; Stillmgs, 1995; etc.) pointed to the existence of a second
representational system, namely, a procedural system of representation. In this system,
knowledge is represented in terms of active processes or procedures. Representations
thus are tied to the performance of a certain task and are not available apart from one's
ability to perform that task (Rumelhart & Norman,1988; Mandler, 1998). While the
sensorimotor information being represented in this system may be inaccessible, Mandler
(1998) pointed out that the storage of this information can be demonstrated through one's
performance of the task at hand. As a result, this system meets her definition of
representations as stored pieces of information that influence behavior (i.e. one's ability
to perform the task).
In addition to the propositional, symbolic and procedural systems of
representation, a fourth, alternative system also has been proposed. In contrast to the
systems just discussed, representations in the distributed, or connectionist, system do not
exist at any one discrete place in memory, nor do they have distinct, descriptive
characteristics such as being composed of images, words, propositions, etc.
Representations in this system instead consist of patterns of activity across homogenous,
neuron-like units distributed throughout the brain (Rumelhart & Norman, 1988; Mandler,
1998). These patterns are initiated and strengthened by one's direct perception of objects
and events in the environment. At a later time, they may be re-activated in the absence of
those objects and events that first produced them, thereby constituting representations.
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For instance, in the previously described scenario of providing directions to the nearest
gas station, our representation of the route that we described would have involved a re-
activation of the patterns of brain activity that initially were produced during an actual
trip along that route. Similarly, our representations of the furniture located in the
darkened room would have involved a re-activation of the patterns of brain activity
produced by our initial perception of this furniture.
Perhaps most pertinent to our opening scenarios of providing directions to the
nearest gas station and navigating through a darkened room is a fifth and final
representational system, namely, the analogical system. According to Rumelhart and
Norman (1988), analogical representations involve a correspondence between the
represented and representing worlds which is as direct as possible, that is, they do not
involve complex symbols or words which "stand" for objects and events. As Mandler
(1998) pointed out, analogical representations initially were considered to be mental
"images" or "pictures" of certain objects and events, however, she has expanded this
system to include "image-schemas". According to her, image schemas are "spatial
representations" which are abstracted from one's perceptual analysis of a given object or
event. Essentially, she argued that we come to pick out selected aspects of highly
complex perceptual objects and events and put them into simpler, more abstract forms.
For example, seeing an object being placed into a cup, one might develop a
representation of "containment" (Mandler, 1998). While this representation does not
correspond explicitly to a specific object or event, it still is information that has been
extracted and stored. Based on this line of reasoning, Mandler (1998) maintained that
6
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such "conscious re-constructions" of information extracted through perceptual analysis
constitute analogical representations.
If image-schemas are to be considered analogical representations, then it seems
logical that the Gibsonian concept of affordances also would be considered part of this
representational system. As Gibson and Pick (1998) define them, affordances are those
properties of the environment that are related to one's capabilities for action. In other
words, affordances involve those actions for which a given object allows. This may
involve any number of actions, including an object's graspability, movability, etc.,. It
clear that if we can evoke information regarding the affordances of given objects in the
absence of those objects themselves, then we would be able to use this information to
guide our actions and reason about those objects. Consequently, it can be argued that
stored information regarding the affordances of given objects must be considered part of
one's representational system. From our perspective, if re-descriptions of objects and
events into abstract concepts through perceptual analysis are to be considered part of the
analogical system of representations, then so too should one's stored information
regarding the affordances of objects.
Can Young Infants Form Representations?
In defining representations and their role in cognition, we have assumed that
adults do indeed rely on representations to reason about objects and events in the world.
Yet while it is apparent that adults can form representations, much debate exists over
when this ability first develops. At the heart of this debate lies the Piagetian concept of
object permanence, or the knowledge that objects continue to exist even when they are
not visible. According to Piaget (1954), infants are not able to form representations of
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absent objects and events until they have developed object permanence. In the standard
Piagetian test of this concept, a desirable toy is placed under a cloth while the infant
watches. Piaget discovered that prior to 8-10 months of age, infants in this situation do
not remove the cloth in order to obtain the toy; he inferred that they behave as if the
object no longer exists. Infants' failure to intentionally search for and locate objects
hidden in this manner was interpreted by Piaget as clear evidence that "out of sight is out
of mind" and that infants younger than 8-10 months of age simply are incapable of
forming a representation.
While the standard Piagetian test of object permanence necessitates the ability to
represent a hidden object and use the information contained in that representation to
reason about and guide one's actions, it also involves a detailed series of motor actions
described by Baillargeon, Spelke, and Wasserman (1985) as means-end behavior. As
Baillargeon et al. characterized it, means-end behavior requires one to coordinate a series
of actions in order to produce a desirable end result. For example, in the standard
Piagetian task just described, the infant must coordinate an initial reach to remove the
cloth with a subsequent reach to obtain the toy. As Baillargeon et al. pointed out, it is
possible that infants fail this test of object permanence simply because they are not able
to produce means-end behavior and not because they are unable to form representations.
In order to investigate infants' abilities to form and utilize representations without
requiring them to produce means-end behavior, Baillargeon et al. (1985) introduced the
dishabituation paradigm. In a set of studies employing this paradigm, infants were
habituated to a "drawbridge" being rotated through 180° (i.e. being raised from a flat,
resting position to a 90° upright position, and then lowered backward to a final, flat
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resting position). Once infants habituated to this event, a block was placed behind the
drawbridge and directly in its path before the drawbridge was raised. Infants then were
shown a possible and an impossible event. In the possible event, the drawbridge rotated
through only 1 12°, until it was stopped by the box lying behind it. In the impossible
event, the drawbridge rotated through the full 180° despite the fact that the box
apparently was lying behind it. Baillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon (1987) found
that infants as young as 3 Vi to 4 months of age dishabituated only to the impossible
event. They maintained that this was due to the factor of "surprise"; infants were
surprised at the occurrence of the impossible event and therefore spent more time looking
at it. Based on this line of reasoning, Baillargeon and colleagues argued that infants were
able to reason that the box continued to exist even though it was occluded as the
drawbridge was raised. In other words, 3 V2 to 4 month old infants were able to represent
the box and its position in the absence of direct perceptual information (i.e. without
vision of the box) and use this information to reason about the events currently being
perceived (i.e. whether the event was possible or impossible).
In a second dishabituation study examining object permanence in 6 month olds,
infants sat in front of a track that was partially occluded by a screen. They then were
shown a toy car that traveled along the track, disappearing and then reappearing from
behind the screen as it moved along a continuous path. Once infants habituated to this
event, the screen was lowered and they were shown a box being placed either directly on
or slightly behind the track on which the car traveled. The screen was lifted and the car
was set in motion once again. Infants again were shown a possible and an impossible
event. In the possible event, the car re-emerged from behind the screen only when the
9
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box was placed behind the track. In the impossible event, the car re-emerged from
behind the screen when the box was placed on the track; in this case, the car appeared
move right through the box which laid in its path (Baillargeon, 1986). Baillargeon found
that 6 month olds dishabituated only to the impossible event, once again suggesting that
this event "surprised" them. She argued that infants in this situation remembered not
only that the car existed, but also that the track and the box existed, even though these
objects were occluded by the screen. Furthermore, Baillargeon maintained that infants
were able to represent the location of the box (i.e. as on or behind the track) despite the
fact that it was occluded. Once again, it appeared as if infants were able to represent
objects and their locations in the absence of those objects themselves and use this
information to reason about the scenario at hand at a younger age than Piaget (1954)
suggested.
While the studies employing the dishabituation paradigm just described do
provide us with interesting information, the suggestion that it is necessary to infer deeper,
cognitive processes to explain the behavior in a basic looking task raises an important
question: "Are the conclusions drawn from these studies warranted?". According to
researchers including Bogartz, Shinskey, and Speaker (1997), the answer is, "No". They
maintained that infants dishabituate to impossible events in studies similar to those just
described (i.e. Baillargeon et al., 1985; Baillargeon, 1986, 1987) solely on the basis of
perceptual novelty and familiarity effects; infants' knowledge regarding the possibility
and/or impossibility of these events does not play a role.
In their analyses of studies employing the dishabituation paradigm, Bogartz and
Shinskey (1998) pointed out that the impossible and possible events presented in many of
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these studies are confounded with perceptual similarities and differences between these
events and the initial habituation events. For example, in the previously described study
by Baillargeon et al. (1985), a drawbridge was rotated through 180° during both the
habituation and impossible test events. As a result, the impossible event was
perceptually identical to the habituation event and therefore should have been familiar to
infants. On the other hand, since the drawbridge was rotated through only 1 12° during
the possible test event, this event should have been perceptually novel to infants.
Clearly, the possible and impossible test events in this and similar studies are confounded
with whether or not the given event is perceptually similar or different from the
habituation event.
According to Bogartz and Shinskey (1998), researchers employing the
dishabituation paradigm often rely on the confounding of possible and impossible test
events with perceptual familiarity and novelty in interpreting their results. Assuming that
infants generally look longer at novel than familiar stimuli, researchers including
Baillargeon and colleagues (i.e. Baillargeon et al., 1985; Baillargeon, 1987) reasoned that
if the looking patterns of infants rely solely on perceptual cues, then infants should look
longer at the possible, novel events than the familiar, impossible ones. The fact that
infants look longer at the perceptually familiar, impossible events than at the perceptually
novel, possible events in dishabituation studies such as those by Baillargeon et al. (1985)
and Baillargeon (1987) therefore was taken as evidence that infants were surprised by the
occurrence of the impossible events and therefore look longer at these events than at the
perceptually novel ones. More importantly, this surprise was interpreted as being the
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direct consequence of infants' abilities to represent and reason about unseen objects and
events.
While the line of reasoning just described does provide one possible explanation
for the results obtained by Baillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon (1987), Bogartz and
Shinskey (1998) suggested an equally plausible one. They maintained that the fact that
infants look longer at the perceptually familiar, impossible event than at the perceptually
novel, impossible event is solely indicative of perceptual familiarity effects; infants in
this situation simply prefer to look at the perceptually familiar event. Based on this line
of reasoning, Bogartz and colleagues (i.e. Bogartz et al., 1987; Bogartz & Shinskey,
1998) maintained that Baillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon's (1987) conclusions
regarding infants' abilities to represent hidden objects are not supported by their data. In
general, since the impossible and possible events are confounded with perceptual
familiarity and novelty, they argued that it simply is not possible to tease apart perception
and cognition in these studies in order to determine whether infants are able to represent
and reason about unseen objects and events.
It is important to note that while the perceptual familiarity effects explanation
offered by Bogartz & Shinskey (1998) may account for the fact that infants looked
significantly longer at the impossible versus the possible events in the drawbridge studies
of Baillargeon et al. (1985) and Baillargeon (1987), these effects do not explain the
previously described results reported by Baillargeon (1986), as well as other, similar
studies. For instance, in contrast to the drawbridge experiment, both the possible and
impossible events in the study by Baillargeon (1986) were perceptually identical to each
other and to the habituation event. As previously described, each of these events
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involved a car traveling along a track, passing behind an occluder, and re-emerging from
behmd that occluder. The only difference between the possible and impossible events
was whether a block was placed behind or directly onto the track before the occluder was
raised and the car was set in motion. Consequently, once the car was set in motion, both
the impossible and possible events should have been perceptually familiar to the infants.
Overall, this fact, along with the fact that infants in this study looked longer at the
impossible versus the possible event, lends support to Baillargeon's conclusion that
infants were able to represent the occluded objects and used these representations to
reason about the possible and impossible events.
As the above discussion illustrates, the conclusions drawn from the dishabituation
studies presented here with regard to infants' abilities to represent unseen objects and
events have sparked much debate. Studies investigating infants' reaching in the dark
toward silent objects, however, lend additional support to the major conclusion draw
from these studies, namely, that infants are able to represent unseen objects and events at
a younger age than Piaget maintained. Like the dishabituation paradigm used by
Baillargeon and colleagues (i.e. Baillargeon et al., 1985; Baillargeon, 1986, 1987),
reaching in the dark studies place infants in a situation in which they must rely on their
representations of objects while removing the need for means-end behavior. Unlike the
passive looking situation of the dishabituation paradigm, however, this situation requires
infants to perform an action (i.e. a reach toward the remembered location of an object) in
order to demonstrate their knowledge of an object's existence and position in space
(Clifton, 1998).
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In an early reaching in the dark study, Wishart, Bower, and Dunkeld (1978)
presented 4 to 12 month old infants with a silent object in the light either to their right or
left while preventing them from reaching for the object. The lights then were turned off,
and the infants were allowed to reach freely. Wishart et al. found that at 5 months of age,
infants reached to the remembered position of the object that they had seen in the light,
even after delays of up to 90 seconds between the lights being extinguished and their first
reaches. Furthermore, infants in this study often engaged in intermediate activity,
ranging from "looking" around the room to crying, when the lights first went out. Since
infants reached to the remembered position of the object even after engaging in this
activity, Wishart et al. concluded that as young as 5 months of age, infants can remember
not only that an object continues to exist in the dark, but they also can remember its
location in space. Once again, the age at which Piaget initially suggested infants achieve
object permanence was challenged.
The findings initially uncovered by Wishart et al. (1978) were replicated in a
subsequent study by Hood and Willatts (1986). In this study, 5 month old infants were
presented with an object in the light either to their left or right while their hands were
restrained. In an additional control condition, infants were given no-object trials during
which they were not shown objects in the light. After being presented/not presented with
an object in the light, the lights were extinguished, the object was removed and the
infants were allowed to reach. Hood and Willatts found that infants reached more to the
target region (i.e. the area immediately surrounding the object's location in the light) than
the non-target regions (the areas opposite the one surrounding the object's location in the
light) on object trials. Like Wishart et al.. Hood and Willatts also found that infants
14
reached into the correct target area after having "looked" away from that area once the
lights were extinguished. Based on these results, they concluded that infants had formed
enduring representations of objects and their locations in the light which later influenced
their reaching in the dark.
While infants' reaching behaviors in studies such as the ones just described
initially appear to provide convincing evidence that infants are able to represent objects
and their locations, several problems do exist. For instance, if 5 month old infants are
able to store representations of objects and their locations, then the infants in the study by
Hood & Willatts (1986) should have had little reason to reach on no-object trials. At the
same time, if infants in this study truly did know where the objects were when reaching
for them in the dark, then their first reaches should have been directed to the target areas
only. Hood and Willatts reported that infants in their study reached equally often during
the object versus the no-object trials. The only difference between these trials was that
infants reached to both of the non-target regions (i.e. the areas to their left and right)
equally often during the no-object trials, but increased their number of reaches to the
target area while decreasing those to the non-target area during the object trials.
Furthermore, infants' first reaches were as likely to be directed to the target as the non-
target areas during the object trials. Taken together, these facts cast doubt on the
conclusions drawn from this study.
While the problems with the reaching in the dark studies just discussed make their
results a bit ambiguous, there are explanations for these results other than the argument
that infants simply cannot form representations. For example, it is possible that infants in
the study by Hood and Willatts (1986) were uncertain as to the existence of an object in
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the dark during the no-object trials. Just because an object is not present in the light
immediately before the lights are extinguished might not signify to an infant that there is
nothing interesting to reach out for in the dark. This especially is possible considering
the fact that the infants in this study had been presented with an object at various
locations in the light on previous trials. As a result, infants simply may have been
exploring their surrounding area in the dark with their reaches during the no-object trials,
rather than reaching for a specific object in a specific location. It is interesting to note
that in a related study, McCall & Clifton (1998) also found that infants reached in the
dark as often during object versus no-object trials. In this study, infants were tested in a
means-end task involving a toy under a cover that had to be opened in the dark. Infants
searched for the toy in the dark regardless of whether they had seen the experimenter
hide the toy before closing the cover in the light. McCall and Clifton attributed the lack
of different frequencies of reaching on no-object versus object trials to infants'
uncertainty about the toy being under the cover from trial to trial.
With regard to the fact that infants' first reaches in the dark were not always
directed toward the target areas in the study by Hood & Willatts (1986), it is important to
note that similar reaching in the dark studies have found infants' first reaches to be
overwhelmingly toward the correct location of the object seen in the light (e.g. Perris &
Clifton, 1988; Goubet & Clifton, 1998). Furthermore, while the fact that infants' first
reaches in the dark were equally likely to be directed toward the target versus the non-
target areas in the study by Hood and Willatts (1986) may seem puzzling, the fact
remains that infants repeatedly reached toward the target areas on object trials as if
searching for an object that they remembered seeing in that location. If infants simply
16
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could not represent objects and their locations at this age, then there should have been
equal amount of reaching to both the target and non-target locations on both object and
no-object trials. The fact that infants repeatedly reached toward the target area on object
trials clearly suggests that some sort of stored information, or representation, must have
influenced the direction of infants' subsequent reaches in the dark.
What Do Infants Represenf^
Despite the criticisms presented here, the results of studies employing the
dishabituation and reaching in the dark paradigms clearly suggest that infants younger
than 8-10 months of age have at least some ability to store information and use this
information to guide their future actions. Yet while the dishabituation and reaching in
the dark studies just discussed attempt to answer the question, "Can infants form
representations?", they do not adequately address the question, "What information is
contained in these representations?". Additional studies examining infants' reaching in
the dark toward sounding objects attempt to answer just this question.
In a study by Perris and Clifton (1988), 6 Vi to 7 month old infants were presented
with a rattle at five positions: mid-line, 30° and 60° to their left and right. A Big Bird
finger puppet was attached to the rattle with Velcro and could be removed easily by the
infants. During a series of warm-up trials in the light, the rattle was shaken at each of the
five positions and advanced to within reach of the infant, at which point s/he could reach
out and obtain the puppet. After the warm-up trials, an experimenter centered the
infant's head at mid-line, turned off the lights, and began to shake the rattle at one of the
five locations within the infant's reach. Perris and Clifton reported that 77% percent of
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the infants reached in the dark for the object, with 75% of their first reaches going into
the target area (i.e. the area immediately surrounding the rattle and toy).
In general, two interpretations of the results obtained by Ferris and Clifton (1988)
are possible. On one hand, it may be argued that infants in this study were able to utilize
the sound cues emitted from the rattle to represent the location of the rattle and toy in
three-dimensional space. Furthermore, since they were unable to see their hands while
reaching in the dark, it also may be argued that infants were able to represent the location
of their hands relative to the rattle and toy (Ferris & Clifton). On the other hand, as
Ferris and Clifton pointed out, these results simply may have indicated that infants were
engaging in a grasping and playing activity in the dark based on their remembrance of
this activity during the warm-up trials in the light. As they suggested, since infants
reached toward the location of the sound rather than to random positions in space, this
remembrance may have been tied to the sound. According to this line of reasoning, the
reaching behavior elicited in this study might not have been the direct consequence of
infants' abilities to utilize sound cues to develop representations of objects and their
locations. It is important to note, however, that according to the definition presented
here, linking the sound of the rattle to general grasping and playing activities would
constitute a representation; infants in this study would have stored information regarding
the link between reaching activity and the rattle sound and used this information to guide
their behavior (i.e. reaching toward the sound in the dark).
In addition to representing the location of a sounding object in space, studies by
Clifton, Ferris, and Bullinger (1991) and Litovsky and Clifton (1992) suggest that infants
can utilize sound cues to determine whether objects are within or beyond reach. For
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instance, Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger presented 6 Vi to 7 month olds with a rattle/toy
combination similar to the one just described. After presenting infants with the rattling
toy in the light during several warm-up trials, infants were presented with the rattle in the
dark, either to their right or left and either within or beyond reach. Clifton, Perris, and
Bullinger found that infants reached more toward the correct location of the toy in the
dark when it was presented within rather than beyond their reach. In a follow-up study,
Litovsky and Clifton replicated these results, finding that infants reached more toward
sounding objects in the dark presented within versus beyond reach even when sound-
pressure level cues were removed. Taken together, these studies clearly suggest that
infants can use sound cues to represent the distance and azimuthal location of invisible
objects.
One key question that arises in the Perris and Clifton (1988), Clifton, Perris, and
Bullinger (1991) and Litovsky and Clifton (1992) studies just described is whether
infants were reaching for the actual objects themselves or simply toward the presented
sounds. As Stack, Muir, Sheriff, and Roman (1989) found, infants will reach for sounds
which they never have had the opportunity to associate with a particular object in the
laboratory. In their study, 2 through 7 month old infants were presented with trial blocks
of invisible auditory rattles and glowing egg-shaped objects in the dark. Stack et al.
found that at 4 through 7 months of age, infants reached toward the invisible object
producing the auditory rattle sounds on more than 50% of the trials presented.
Furthermore, they found that there was no difference in the amount of reaching when the
auditory trial blocks were presented before instead of after the visual trial blocks. As a
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result, they concluded that infants' reaching did not depend on their ability to associate
the rattle sounds with a particular object in the laboratory.
The willingness of infants to reach toward a sound that has not been paired with a
particular object in the light in the laboratory also has been demonstrated by Clifton,
Perris, and McCall (1999). In this study, one group of infants was allowed to reach for a
rattle/toy combination in the light. A second group of infants (i.e. the no-sound group)
was allowed to reach only for silent objects in the light. Finally, infants in a third, social-
interaction group were not presented with objects in the light at all, rather, they simply
played with an experimenter for a comparable amount of time. During test trials, infants
in all three groups were presented with rattle sounds within reach and at a variety of
positions in the dark. According to Clifton, Perris, and McCall, infants in both the no-
sound and social-interaction groups reached toward the rattle sounds as often as infants
who were presented with the rattle/toy combinations in the light. Like the study by Stack
et al. (1989), this study once again demonstrated that infants will reach for sound alone.
More importantly, these studies provide evidence for the possibility that infants in the
studies by Perris and Clifton (1988), Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger (1991), and Litovsky
and Clifton (1992) may have been reaching simply toward sounds, and not toward their
representations of given objects.
In order to test the hypothesis that infants in the above studies were simply
reaching toward sounds and not represented objects, Clifton, Rochat, Litovsky, and Perris
(1991) presented 6 V2 month old infants with both large and small hoops and allowed
them to reach for these objects in the light. Each object was presented with either jingle
bell or rattle sounds in such a manner that one type of sound specified the large object
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and the other specified the small object. After eight warm-up trials of reaching for the
large and small sounding objects in the light, infants were presented with these sounding
objects in the dark. Clifton, Rochat, et al. found evidence of differential reaching styles
for the large and small objects in both the light and dark conditions. As they reported,
infants often reached for the small object with one hand and the large object with both
hands in both the light and the dark. Furthermore, in an examination of infants' hand
placements on the large object, Clifton, Rochat, et al. found that infants reached around
the entire perimeter of the large object, and not just toward the sound device located at
the top of this object during both the light and dark trials.
Taken together, the results of the study just described suggest that infants can
develop an association between particular sounds and types of objects and can use this
information to guide their behavior. If infants in this study were reaching strictly for the
sound itself, then their hand placements on the large object should have been clustered at
the top of the object, where the sound device was located, and not around the object's
perimeter. The fact that infants' hand placements on the large object included the entire
perimeter of the object demonstrates that infants in this study were not reaching strictly
for the sound itself. Furthermore, the fact that infants reached differentially for the small
and large objects in the dark suggests that they were able to associate the specific objects
with their respective sounds. More importantly, this result suggests that they used this
information to guide their reaching when they could only hear but not see the objects for
which they were reaching (Clifton, Rochat, et al.). Based on these results, Clifton,
Rochat, et al. concluded that infants can represent the shape and graspability of an unseen
object and utilize this information to guide their reaching in the dark.
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In drawing conclusions about what types of information are included in infants'
representations of sounding objects in the dark, it is important to note that the continuous
sounds used to signal the presence of objects in the dark in the studies just described
provided infants with on-going perceptual cues. As is clear, infants in these studies were
not evoking representations of given objects or events in the complete absence of
perceptual information, rather, they were receiving on-going perceptual support from
these sounds. As a result, the suggestion that the infants in these studies have achieved
object permanence and therefore are capable of forming representations is debatable.
In order to deal with the question of whether infants are able to represent objects
and events in the complete absence of on-going perceptual information, Goubet and
Clifton (1998) designed a situation that required infants to utilize their representations of
an event while receiving no such support. In this study, an apparatus consisting of a
vertical wooden tube with wooden pegs attached to its inside was developed. When a
light, plastic ball was dropped through the tube, the ball made a series of sounds as it hit
these wooden pegs. Attached to the end of this tube were three additional chutes, two of
which directed the ball to a final resting position in a tray positioned either to the right or
left of the infant, and a third which directed it toward a tray located at his/her mid-line.
Wooden pegs were attached only to the initial portions of these chutes, with the
remaining portions being covered with felt. As a result, the ball produced sounds only as
it traveled part of the way down these chutes, traveling silently the remainder of the way
until silently landing in one of the trays.
Goubet and Clifton (1998) presented 6 V2 month olds with a series of eight light
trials in order to familiarize them with the apparatus just described. In the side-
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experience group, infants saw and heard the ball traveling down the tube and chutes and
arriving at their left on four of the trials and at their right on the remainder of the trials;
the center chute was hidden during these trials. The mid-line group of infants, on the
other hand, saw and heard the ball traveling only through the tube and chute at his/her
mid-line; the two side chutes were hidden from the infants in this group during these
trials. All infants were encouraged to reach out and obtain the ball once it became
available in its respective tray. At the end of the familiarization trials, the lights were
extinguished and both groups were presented with a series of trials during which the ball
landed either to their right or to their left. During these trials, the infants heard the ball
travel down the vertical tube and part of the way down one of the two side chutes.
Finally, there was a period of silence as the ball traveled into the appropriate side tray
and became available for pick-up.
Goubet and Clifton (1998) found that infants in both the side-experience and mid-
line groups initiated their first reaches in the dark only after the ball had landed in the
tray, that is, several seconds after the sound cues had stopped. Infants in both groups also
spent an equivalent amount of time searching for the ball, however, infants in the side-
experience group reached into the correct area of the apparatus (i.e. the silent area of the
apparatus and the area of the tray in which the ball was located) more often in the dark
than infants in mid-line group. In addition, infants in the side-experience group whose
first reaches were into an incorrect area of the apparatus were more likely to initiate
subsequent corrective reaches toward the correct location of the ball than infants in the
mid-line group.
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Taken together, the results of the study by Goubet and CHfton (1998) led them to
make several interesting points regarding infants' representations. First, the fact that
infants waited several seconds before initiating their first reach, along with the fact that
the side-experience group reached significantly more toward the silent than the sounding
parts of the apparatus, suggested that infants did not need on-going perceptual support to
guide their reaches toward the correct location of the ball. These results also can be
taken as further evidence that infants who have formed associations between particular
sounds and objects really are reaching for the objects, and not simply toward sounds. In
addition, since both groups spent the same amount of time searching for the ball, it
appeared as if infants in both groups were able to represent the existence of the ball in the
absence of on-going perceptual support (i.e. in silence). The fact that the side-experience
group reached into the correct target area more often than the mid-line group suggested
that while both groups knew that the ball existed in the dark, only the side-experience
group was able to form a useful representation of the apparatus in the light. For this
group, the event of the ball traveling down the chutes in the dark matched their
representations of this event in the light. Consequently, infants in the side-experience
group had a useful representation on which to rely when searching for the ball in the
dark. The conflict between the light and dark events experienced by the mid-line group,
on the other hand, might explain why this group appeared to have trouble locating the
ball in the dark. Infants in the mid-line group simply had no way to interpret the sound
cues which indicated the ball's path because they did not have a similar experience in the
light which could be called upon to guide their search for the ball in the dark (Goubet &
Clifton).
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The ability of 6 Vi month old infants to represent the type of event presented by
Goubet and Clifton (1998) opens the door to the question, "What other types of tasks
might infants be able to represent?". McCall and Clifton (1998) answered this question
with a study demonstrating 7 Vi to 8 Vi month old infants' abilities to represent an entire
means-ends task in the absence of on-going perceptual support. In this study, infants
were shown a hinged box that opened to the side. Inside the box was a speaker with a toy
attached to it. Essentially, infants could open the box with one reach and obtain the toy
with a subsequent reach. In a series of warm-up trials, the experimenter placed the toy in
the box and closed the door over the toy while the infant watched. Once the door was
closed, a rattle sound was emitted from the speaker inside the box and the entire box was
pushed to within reach of the infant. Once the infant opened the box, the sound stopped
and s/he was allowed to make a second reach for the toy in silence. At the conclusion of
the warm-up trials, infants were given a series of test trials during which they watched
the experimenter close the box either over the toy or over an empty space. The sound
was started, the lights were extinguished and the box then was pushed within reach of the
infant.
McCall and Clifton (1998) found that on 70% of the dark trials, infants who made
a first reach for the apparatus and opened the box also made a second reach to obtain the
toy. If, as some have suggested, infants are not able to form representations of objects
and events in the absence of on-going perceptual support, infants in this study should
have assumed that the box and toy no longer existed once the sound stopped and
therefore should have had little reason to produce a subsequent reach to obtain the toy.
The fact that infants reached for the toy after opening the box without being able to see
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either the toy or their actions as they opened the box suggests that they were able to
represent the set-up of the apparatus as well as the existence and position of the toy
relative to themselves and to the box. More impressively, infants in this situation must
have been able to represent the invisible displacement of the toy, that is, they must have
been able to reason that once the box was pushed forward in the dark, so was the toy
(McCall & Clifton).
Taken together, the results of the studies described here lead to several
conclusions regarding the types of information contained in infants' representations of
objects and events. Studies by Perris and Clifton (1988), Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger
(1991) and Litovsky and Clifton (1992) suggest that once infants have formed an
association between objects and their particular sounds, they can utilize this information
to represent the locations of those objects in three-dimensional space. Furthermore, since
infants are unable to see their hands when reaching for objects in the dark, these studies
also suggest that infants can represent the position of their hands relative to the objects
for which they are reaching (Clifton, 1998). Similarly, Clifton, Rochat, et al. (1991)
demonstrated that once an association between an object and a sound has been formed,
infants can represent the shape and graspability of that object when presented only with
its sound. Finally, studies by Goubet and Clifton (1998) and McCall and Clifton (1998)
demonstrated that infants can represent entire events and means-ends tasks and use these
representations to reason about the existence and location of the objects involved even in
the absence of on-going perceptual support.
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Plaguing Problems and Possible Explan;<tinn^
Is It the Sound or Is It the Object?
As previously suggested, the question of whether or not infants really "know"
what they are reaching for in the dark (i.e. a particular object) has plagued the reaching in
the dark literature. While studies by Perris & Clifton (1988) Clifton, Perris, and
Bullinger (1991), Litovsky and Clifton (1992), Clifton, Rochat, et al. (1991), Goubet and
Clifton (1998) and McCall and Clifton (1998) all suggest that the infants in these studies
were reaching for represented objects rather than random sounds, the fact remains that
infants also are willing to reach for sounds which they have not been trained to associate
with particular objects (Stack et al., 1989; Clifton, Perris & McCall, 1999). This
willingness automatically calls into question any conclusions regarding infants'
representations of unseen objects drawn from the reaching in the dark studies presented
here.
Can representations be used to explain why infants reach toward sounding objects
in the dark even when they have not been trained to associate these sounds with
particular objects? Stack et al. (1989) suggested that the answer to this question is,
"Yes". They assumed that infants who reach toward "invisible sounds" perceive these
sounds as objects. Accordingly, infants in both the Stack et al. and Clifton, Perris, and
McCall (1999) studies must have had some sort of representation which linked particular
objects with the presented sounds in these studies in order to guide their reaches. Yet
while this line of reasoning seems plausible, several questions remain. Why would
infants who are presented with sounds in the dark assume that these sounds signify
objects without first being trained in the light to associate those sounds with particular
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objects? Furthermore, what types of objects would they associate with those sounds?
Finally, what information would be contained in infants' representations of those
sounding objects?
One hint to answering these three questions may lie in the types of sounds used in
the reaching in the dark studies presented here. For instance, in both the Stack et al.
(1989) and Clifton, Perris, & McCall (1999) studies, infants were presented with rattle
sounds in the dark. Since rattles are extremely common baby toys in our society, it is
more than likely that most infants have played with these toys in their homes. As a
result, it is possible that infants in the Stack et al. and Clifton, Perris, and McCall studies
came into the laboratory with a well-developed association between the sounds of a rattle
and either a particular rattle or rattles in general as graspable objects. Consequently, the
infants in the Stack et al. and Perris, Clifton, and McCall studies may have been reaching
for a "graspable object" (i.e. a rattle) based on their previously developed representations
of rattles and the sounds that they produce.
The argument that infants in the Stack et al. (1989) and Clifton, Perris, and
McCall (1999) studies were guided by their representations of objects associated with
rattle sounds is suggested by the set of studies conducted by Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger
(1991). As previously described, 6 V2 to 7 month olds in one of these studies received
two warm-up trials in the light during which they were presented with an object that
made a rattle sound. In a second study, the sound of the object was changed to a series of
computer-generated "pips". Following only two warm-up trials, infants were presented
with these sounds in the dark. In the first study, Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger found that
infants presented with the rattle sounds reached on approximately 59% of the dark trials
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in which the object was placed within reach. In the second study, however, infants who
were presented with the computer-generated "pips" reached on only 31% of the dark
trials in which the sound was presented within reach.
Initially, Clifton, Perris, & Bullinger (1991) suggested that the pattern of results
just described may have been due to the fact that the computer-generated sounds were
hard to localize or were less appealing to the infants than the rattle sounds; however, a
second explanation involving infants' representations is plausible. It is possible that the
two warm-up trials in the light simply did not provide infants with enough experience to
develop an association between these objects and their respective sounds. This being the
case, many infants may not have developed representations of the sounding objects
presented in these studies on which they could rely to guide their reaching in the dark.
Assuming that the computer-generated pips were novel sounds for the infants, those who
heard these sounds in the dark may have reached infrequently simply because they had
no representation of the type of object (i.e. graspable or not graspable) producing those
unusual sounds. On the other hand, infants who heard the rattle sounds in the dark may
have relied upon their past experiences with rattles outside of the laboratory to guide their
reaching in the dark. In general, the establishment of representations of rattles as
graspable objects outside of the laboratory may explain why infants in this study reached
more frequently toward the rattle versus the computer-generated sounds.
According to the representation hypothesis just described, the apparent conflict
between the results uncovered by Stack et al. (1989) and Clifton, Perris, and McCall
(1999) and the conclusions reached by Perris & Clifton (1988) Clifton, Perris, and
Bullinger (1991), Litovsky and Clifton (1992), Clifton, Rochat, et al. (1991), Goubet and
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Clifton (1998), and McCall and Clifton (1998) would be reconcilable. Essentially, it
would appear as if infants in each of these studies were relying on their representations of
sounding objects to guide their reaches in the dark. Furthermore, if supported by data,
this hypothesis would make it clear that infants are capable of forming representations of
objects and events and do rely on these representations to guide their behavior.
The Classical Conditioning Argument
In addition to the question of whether infants in the reaching in the dark studies
presented here were reaching toward sounds or actual objects, the question of whether
their reaches were classically conditioned in the light also has plagued these studies. As
we have seen in most of the reaching in the dark studies discussed here, infants always
were presented with a number of training trials in the light in order to familiarize them
with the apparatus, sounds, objects, etc. and to train them to associate given sounds with
certain objects or events. During these familiarization trials, infants consistently were
presented with sounding objects for a short period of time before actually reaching for
those objects (Perris & Clifton, 1988; Clifton, Rochat, et al., 1991; Clifton, Perris, &
Bullinger 1991; Litovsky & Clifton, 1992; etc.). In this situation, it can be argued that
the sight of the toy (i.e. an unconditioned stimulus) was paired with the sound of the toy
(i.e. a conditioned stimulus), which in turn, led infants to produce a reach for the toy (i.e.
a conditioned response). Consequently, it is possible that infants were classically
conditioned to reach for the sounding objects during these trials; they may have been
trained to emit a conditioned motor action (i.e. a reach) in response to the sounds of the
objects (i.e. the conditioned stimuli) (Clifton, Rochat, et al., 1991). If this was the case,
then the infants in the studies mentioned here simply may have been producing a
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conditioned motor response toward a sound rather than executing a reach based on their
representations of the objects and events at hand.
While the conditioning argument just described provides us with an alternative
explanation for the results uncovered in the reaching in the dark studies presented here, a
careful analysis of these results suggests that infants' reaches in the dark were more than
just simple conditioned responses. For example, if infants in the Clifton, Perris, and
Bullinger (1991) and Litovsky and Clifton (1992) studies simply were conditioned to
reach in response to any sound, then they should have reached equally often during trials
in which the object was presented beyond versus within reach, especially since both of
these conditions involved the same sounds. The fact that infants reached more often
toward sounds presented within versus beyond reach suggests that infants in this study
were able to represent the location of the sounding objects in the dark in relation to their
bodies (i.e. beyond or within reach), as well as the affordance of reaching and grasping
(Clifton, Perris, and Bullinger).
An analysis of infants' reaching patterns in the light and dark conditions of the
previously discussed study by Clifton, Rochat, et al. (1991) provides further evidence
against the conditioning hypothesis just described. As mentioned previously, Clifton,
Rochat, et al. examined infants' hand placements on the large and small sounding objects
for which they reached in both the light and dark conditions of their study. As they
pointed out, if infants had been conditioned to reach differentially toward these objects in
the light, then their reaches in the dark should have had a similar, rigid morphology when
compared to their reaches in the light. In general, Clifton, Rochat, et al. (1991) found
significant variability in the reaching positions used by infants in the light versus the dark
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conditions of this study. Based on this result, they concluded that infants' reaches in the
dark were not merely the result of classical conditioning.
A final line of evidence against the conditioning hypothesis comes from Goubet
and Clifton (1998) and McCall and Clifton (1998). As previously mentioned, Goubet
and Clifton found that infants waited for a period of 4 seconds or longer in silence before
initiating their first reaches toward the apparatus in their study. Furthermore, infants
reached toward the silent and not the sounding parts of the apparatus. Likewise, in the
study by McCall and Clifton, infants made a second reach toward the apparatus in
complete silence. If infants' reaching in these studies had been conditioned, then the
infants should not have waited to initiate their first reaches or made subsequent reaches
toward the apparatus in the absence of the conditioned stimuli (i.e. the sounds).
While the results of the studies just discussed provide evidence against the
conditioning hypothesis, there are various aspects of these studies which would
simultaneously allow a die-hard conditioning theorist to maintain that infants' reaches in
these studies were conditioned. For example, Clifton, Rochat, et al. (1991) reported that
infants used different types of reaches (i.e. one versus two-handed reaches) when
reaching for the small versus the large object in both the light and the dark conditions of
their study. It could be argued that the type of reach used to obtain the large and small
object was the result of forward conditioning. From this perspective, infants may have
been trained to elicit differential reaches to the unique sounds produced by the different
sized objects. As a result, infants may have produced differential reaches in the dark
solely in response to the different sounds that they heard. Similarly, in the study by
McCall and Clifton (1998), it is possible that infants were conditioned to produce a series
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of motor actions (i.e. a series of reaches) in response to the sounds presented in this
study. This is especially plausible in light of the fact that infants who received no-object
trials in this study (i.e. they were shown the box being closed over an empty space)
produced a second reach for the toy in the dark as often as those who received object
trials (McCall & Clifton). Consequently, a die-hard conditioning theorist would argue
that if infants in this study truly had formed a representation of the event that occurred
prior to the lights being extinguished, then they should have had little reason to elicit a
second reach toward the apparatus to obtain the toy. Overall, if infants in the reaching in
the dark studies described here were conditioned to produce a series of motor actions as a
result of the pairing of sounds and motor actions during warm-up trials, then it is possible
that these infants were not relying on representations to guide their behavior; they simply
may have been executing a sequence of motor actions (i.e. a conditioned chain of
responses) in response to a sound (i.e. a conditioned stimulus).
The Current Study
Selecting a Sound
In order to test the representation hypothesis that infants in the studies by Stack et
al. (1989) and Clifton, Perris, and McCall (1999) were not reaching in the dark toward
the rattle sounds alone but were reaching based on their representations of the graspable
objects associated with these sounds, we needed to find a sound that infants would not
reach for in the dark when they have not been given the opportunity to associate it with a
graspable object. It was reasoned that this sound should either be a familiar sound that
infants may have heard outside of the laboratory but that would not be associated with a
graspable object or it should be a completely novel sound.
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Two sounds, an electronic doorbell sound and a computer-generated "chirping"
sound, were tested during piloting and parents were asked whether these sounds
resembled any sound that their infants might have heard at home. Both sounds were
found to elicit comparably low amounts of reaching, with infants reaching on 33% versus
40% of the dark trials during which they were presented with the doorbell and the
chirping sounds respectively. Furthermore, the majority of parents reported that both
sounds should have been unfamiliar to their infants. In the case of the doorbell sound,
even when parents did report owning a doorbell, the majority of them maintained that
their home doorbells did not sound similar to the doorbell sound heard in the laboratory.
Since both sounds elicited comparably low levels of reaching in the dark, the
question of whether to use only one or both of these sounds in the current study
remained. In answering this question, it is important to note that while doorbells are
sounds that may be present in an infant's environment, infants simply do not have the
opportunity to grasp and tactually explore the sources of these sounds. As a result, it was
reasoned that even in cases where the doorbell is a familiar sound to infants, they should
not have associated it with a graspable object outside of the laboratory. At the same time,
several parents pointed out during piloting that certain toys do produce sounds very
similar to the computer-generated chirping sound presented to their infants. In fact, one
mother reported owning one of these toys. Based on this information, it was reasoned
that infants who do own and play with such toys may enter the laboratory with a
previously developed representation associating the chirping sound with a graspable
object, that is, a toy. In order to avoid this possibility and based on the above line of
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reasoning regarding the doorbell, the doorbell sound was selected as the sole stimulus for
the current study.
The Design
In the current study, infants were divided into two groups, a silent-object and a
sound-experience group. Infants in the silent-object group received a series of
familiarization trials in the light during which they were able to reach for and manipulate
only a silent object. Infants in the sound-experience group also received a series of
familiarization trials in the light during which they were encouraged to reach for this
same object. Once the infants in this group reached for and were manipulating this
object, however, it produced a doorbell sound. Based on the results of piloting and the
rationale described in the previous section, it was reasoned that regardless of infants'
familiarity with this sound, they should never have had the opportunity to associate it
with a graspable object outside of the laboratory. For both groups, the purpose of these
familiarization trials was to ensure that infants were willing to engage in reaching
behavior. For infants in the sound-experience group, however, these trials also provided
the opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a graspable object. Finally, infants
in both groups were presented with the doorbell sound in the dark during subsequent test
trials and were allowed to reach freely.
As is clear from the design presented here, infants in the silent-object group were
reaching for and manipulating only a silent object in the light, thereby eliminating the
potential for the forward conditioning of a motor action (i.e. a reach) in response to a
sound to occur. At the same time, however, infants in the sound-experience group were
exposed to a sounding object during the familiarization trials. As a result, the classical
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conditioning argument which has plagued previous reaching in the dark studies could
have been a problem for this group. In an attempt to control for the potential of
conditioning infants' reaches for the sounding object and as alluded to above, the object
was presented to the infants in this group in silence during the familiarization trials; this
object did not make a sound until after infants had successfully completed their reaches
and were manipulating the object themselves. As a result, the sound followed the act of
reaching, rather than preceding it and potentially acting as a conditioned stimulus.
Predictions
In the current study, it was reasoned that regardless of their familiarity with the
doorbell sound, infants in the silent-object group should never have had the opportunity
to associate this sound with a graspable object. On the other hand, infants in the sound-
experience group were given the opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a
graspable object during the familiarization trials. According to the representation
hypothesis, it was expected that because of their experience in manipulating the sounding
object during the familiarization trials, infants in the sound-experience group would be
able to develop a representation of the graspable object associated with the doorbell
sound. Furthermore, this hypothesis suggests that these infants should rely on this
representation to guide their reaching in the dark. As a result, it was predicted that
infants in the sound-experience group would reach toward the doorbell sound presented
to them in the dark more often and on significantly more trials than infants in the silent-
object group.
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CHAPTER 2
METHOD
Subjects
A total of 46 infants were recruited from the state birth records of Massachusetts
with an explanatory letter followed by a telephone call. All infants were full term, had
suspicion of hearing loss and were in good health on the day of testing. Fourteen infants
(6 female, 8 male) were eliminated, 10 (3 from the silent-object group and 7 from the
sound-experience group) due to fussiness/inability to complete the session, 3 (2 from the
silent-object group and 1 from the sound-experience group) due to experimenter error,
and 1 (from the silent-object group) because the parent spoke to the infant during the
dark trials. Of the remaining 32 infants, half (6 male, 10 female) were randomly assigned
to the silent-object group and half (10 male, 6 female) to the sound-experience group.
These infants ranged in age from 26 weeks, 4 days to 30 weeks, 4 days, with the mean
for the sound-experience group being 28 weeks, 2 days (SD=6.82 days) and the mean age
for the silent-object group being 28 weeks, 5 days (SD=7.18 days).
Apparatus
The apparatus was a hard-plastic toy elephant (12 x 7.5 x 11 cm) whose trunk
allowed for easy manipulation by infants. The sound-device portion of a wireless,
battery-operated doorbell system (Radio Shack cat. no. 63-872) was implanted inside the
toy. A tight screw-top cap attached to the top of the elephant prevented infants from
coming into contact with the sound-device. The testing experimenter was able to activate
the sound-device while infants manipulated the toy using a remote control.
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Testing took place in a suite of rooms consisting of an outer equipment room and
an inner, sound-deadened, testing room. An infrared video camera suspended above the
infants was used to videotape their behavior in both the Hght and the dark. To aid in
scoring, the video signal was passed through a date-time generator (For-A). In addition,
an experimenter located in the outer equipment room observed the events occurring in
the testing room via a monitor connected to the infrared camera. As a result, s/he was
able to inform the testing experimenter of the behavior of infants during the dark trials
via a microphone connected to a set of headphones worn by the testing experimenter.
This experimenter also timed each trial and communicated to the testing experimenter
when the appropriate time limits had been reached. Finally, the lights in the testing room
were controlled by a foot-pedal that allowed the testing experimenter to extinguish them
at the onset of the dark trials.
Procedure
Each infant was seated directly across from the testing experimenter on his/her
parent's lap at a comfortable reaching height and distance from a 31 x 91 cm table
throughout the entire session. Parents were instructed to hold their infants securely at the
waist to allow for unrestricted arm movements. In order to prevent parents from
accidentally cueing their infants to orient and/or reach toward the sound presented to
them in the dark, parents wore a set of headphones during the testing session. The
headphones were connected to a small, clip-on microphone worn by the testing
experimenter. Since all of the sounds in the room were presented in both ears of the
headphones through this microphone, parents were unable to determine the location of
the toy (i.e. the source of the doorbell sound) during the dark trials.
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Once seated, infants in both groups were allowed a brief period of warm-up time.
The purpose of this time simply was to ensure that each infant was comfortable with both
the experimenter and the experimental situation and to ensure that s/he was willing to
engage in reaching behavior. During this time, the testing experimenter repeatedly
presented each infant with a silent toy that was different from the primary stimulus toy
(i.e. a yellow sippy-cup toy that had a face painted on it or a yellow rubber duck). Both
the experimenter and the parent were allowed to talk to the infant during this time in
order to encourage him/her to reach for and manipulate the toy. The warm-up period
continued until the testing experimenter was satisfied that the infant was comfortable and
willing to engage in reaching behavior.
Following the warm-up period, infants were presented with a series of timed
familiarization trials. These trials had two primary goals. First, since infants in both
groups would be presented with a doorbell sound for 15 seconds in the dark during
subsequent dark trials, it was crucial to ensure that all infants would reach for a toy
presented to them within this same time frame in the light without any verbal
encouragement from their parents and/or the experimenter. In addition to this, these
trials also provided infants in the sound-experience group only with an opportunity to
associate the doorbell sound with a specific, graspable toy.
During the familiarization trials, each infant in the silent-object group was
presented with the toy elephant at his/her mid-line. Both the parent and the testing
experimenter refrained from speaking to the infant during this time, encouraging him/her
to reach for the toy only through the use of facial expressions (e.g. smiling, nodding, etc.)
when necessary. The infant was given a period of 15 seconds from the time of
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presentation to reach for and obtain the toy. If s/he failed to reach for the toy during this
time, the experimenter in the outer room notified the testing experimenter, who then
removed the toy and proceeded with the next trial. If, on the other hand, the infant did
reach for the toy, s/he was allowed to manipulate and explore it for an additional 15
seconds from the time of his/her first contact with it. At the conclusion of the 1 5 seconds
of manipulation time, the experimenter in the outer equipment room signaled the testing
experimenter. The testing experimenter then removed the toy and after a brief inter-trial
interval, began the next trial. The familiarization trials continued in this manner until the
infant successfully reached for and manipulated the toy on a total of four trials.
Like infants in the silent-object group, infants in the sound-experience group also
were presented with the same silent toy elephant at mid-line during the familiarization
trials. Again, each infant was given 15 seconds from the time of presentation to reach for
and obtain the toy. If the infant failed to reach for the toy during this time, it was
removed and the next trial began. On the other hand, once infants in this group reached
for and were manipulating the toy, it began to make a doorbell sound. This sound was
triggered by the testing experimenter via a remote control and was produced by a sound-
device implanted in the toy. The toy continued to produce the doorbell sound as long as
the infant remained in contact with it. If the infant released the toy, the experimenter
stopped triggering the sound-device until the infant re-initiated contact with it. Like the
infants in the silent-object group, each infant in this group was allowed to manipulate and
explore the toy for 15 seconds from the time of his/her first contact with the toy. Again,
the familiarization trials continued until the infant had successfully reached for and
manipulated the toy during four trials.
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Following the familiarization trials in the light, infants in both the silent-object
and sound-experience groups were presented with eight dark trials. At the onset of each
trial, the testing experimenter centered the infant's attention at mid-line and then
extinguished the lights by depressing a foot pedal. The experimenter then placed the toy
at 60° to the infant's left or right and within reaching distance (i.e. approximately 32 cm
from the infant's mid-line) before triggering the doorbell sound. The sound continued for
15 seconds or until the infant reached out and contacted the toy, at which time the toy
was removed and the lights were turned on.
It is important to note that the presentation of the toy at 60° to the infant's right
and left and at a finger-tip's distance was an attempt to control for accidental contact with
the toy in the dark. In piloting, it was observed that infants often sat with their hands
resting at mid-line on the table. As a result, if the toy was presented to the infant at mid-
line in the dark, it was possible that s/he would accidentally come into contact with the
toy as the experimenter presented it. Furthermore, if presented much closer to the infant,
s/he might accidentally contact it if s/he were to turn or swing his/her arms. This
accidental contact might have signaled to the infant that there was a graspable object
producing the sound in the dark and might have resulted in the infant reaching in the dark
toward this sound during subsequent trials. If this were to happen in the silent-object
group, then infants in this group would have the opportunity to associate the sound with a
graspable object, thereby defeating the purpose of this group (i.e. infants who had not had
the opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a graspable object). By presenting
the toy to the infant's right and left and at a finger-tip's distance, the potential for
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accidental contact was decreased; ideally, the infant must have initiated an intentional
reach for the toy in order to grasp or touch it.
In order to guide the testing experimenter as to the placement of the toy in the
dark, clear plastic strips of contact paper were placed on the table, demarcating two lines
extending from the infant's mid-line to the right and left edges of the table at 60° angles
from the infant's mid-line. In the dark, the testing experimenter was able to feel along
these strips with her fingertips to ensure the proper placement of the toy. The placement
of the toy in the dark also was monitored by the second experimenter located in the outer
equipment room. By communicating with the testing experimenter via headphones, this
experimenter ensured that the toy was placed within reach of the infant.
A single sequence of dark trials was generated with the restriction that the toy be
presented to the right (R) during four of the trials and to the left (L) during the remaining
number of trials. The sequence was reversed for half of the infants in each group. As a
result, half of the infants in each group were presented with the sounding toy in the order
L-R-R-L-R-L-L-R (referred to as order 1) while the remaining infants were presented
with the sounding toy in the mirror image of this sequence, that is, R-L-L-R-L-R-R-L
(referred to as order 2).
Finally, in order to determine whether infants in both groups remained interested
in the task at hand and were willing to engage in reaching behavior throughout the entire
session, the dark trials were interspersed with four light test trials similar to the
familiarization trials of each respective group. Unlike the initial familiarization trials,
however, the toy was not removed if the infant did not reach for it within 15 seconds
from the time of presentation. During these trials, the toy was available until the infant
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reached for and obtained it. For infants in the sound-experience group, these additional
light trials also served as reminders of the sounding toy. Once again, a single random
sequence for the dark and light trials was generated with the restriction that infants
received no more than two dark trials in a row. As a result, the sequence of dark (D) and
light (L) trials was as follows: D-D-L-D-L-D-D-L-D-L-D-D.
The testing session continued as long as the infant did not become fussy. If an
infant began to fuss or cry during the session, a short break was taken. Upon resuming
the testing session, the infant was presented with one light test trial regardless of where in
the session the break had been taken. The session then proceeded from the point of ihe
break until completion.
Scoring of Data
Videotapes of the testing sessions were coded by two independent observers. For
the familiarization and light test trials, observers recorded trial onset, whether there was a
reach, the time of onset of the first reach for the toy, and the duration of each infant's
contact with the toy. Trial onset was defined as the frame when the testing experimenter
first began to release the toy when presenting it to the infant. On those occasions when
infants reached for and contacted the toy as the testing experimenter presented it (i.e.
before the testing experimenter had the opportunity to release the toy), the starting time
of the trial was recorded as the frame when the infant first contacted the toy. In order to
determine how long each infant spent in contact with the toy in the light, observers
recorded the frames during which infants contacted and released the toy. If an infant
contacted and released the toy on more than one occasion per trial, observers recorded
the frames of each release and re-initiation of contact. If, however, an infant released and
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re-initiated contact with the toy within 2 seconds, the release and re-initiation of contact
times were excluded. For each of these famiharization and light trial measures, scoring
was done without sound so as to keep observers blind to the condition of each infant.
For the dark test trials, observers coded trial onset, the number of reaches made
during each trial, the onset time of the first reach, whether each reach ended in contact
with the toy, the sector in which each reach terminated, and whether there was any
accidental contact with the toy during each trial. For these trials, trial onset was defined
as the frame when the observer first heard the doorbell sound after the lights had been
extinguished. A reach was defined as a continuous motion of the arm, with an opened
hand and in a forward direction, that extended over the edge of the table. There must
have been extension of the elbow and an increase in the angle between the shoulder and
the forearm. Because infants often became interested in simply patting the table during
the light and dark trials, a definition for patting also was devised to aid observers in
distinguishing reaches from instances of patting. Patting was defined as a continuous
motion of the arm(s) in a forward direction that extended over the edge of the table but
was followed by immediate, repeated up and down movements of the arm(s) in the same
place. Clear instances of patting were not coded as reaches.
In order to code the sector in which each reach terminated, a clear template was
created that could be placed on the monitor screen. This template marked the reaching
space of the infant on the table as a 180° semi-circle, with the mid-line of the table
serving as the 90° mark. This semi-circle was divided further into 6 sectors of 30° each,
with each sector being numbered. The termination of a reach was defined as the moment
in which the infant's hand stopped moving forward or reversed direction. Lastly, a
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definition for accidental contact was devised for determining whether a reach or any
other movement of the arm and hand ended in contact with the toy accidentally. An
accidental contact was determined to be any contact with the toy with a closed hand or
the back of the hand (not including the fingers).
Finally, in order to determine whether the doorbell sound was localized easily by
infants, observers recorded the direction of infants' very first head turns and the amount
of time they spent oriented toward the direction of the sounding toy during each dark test
trial. In order to do this, the mid-line mark of the table as demarcated by the template
just described was used. The direction of the first head turn away from this mid-line
mark and either toward or away from the toy once the doorbell sound had started was
recorded as the direction of the infant's first head turn. In scoring the amount of time
spent oriented toward the sounding toy, a stop-watch was used. Each time an infant
turned away from mid-line and toward the hemifield where the sounding toy was located,
the observer began the stop-watch and any time the infant turned away from the correct
hemifield, turned backward toward his/her parent, or faced straight ahead (i.e. at mid-
line) the observer stopped the stop-watch. If an infant was not centered at mid-line at the
start of the trial (i.e. if s/he turned his/her head as the experimenter extinguished the
lights), the trial was not scored with regard to head turn and orientation time only.
Inter-Observer Reliability
The reliability between observers was computed as the number of agreements divided by
the sum of the number of agreements and disagreements. In addition, the Pearson
correlation coefficient was computed for the time-based measures and the number of
reaches per trial; Cohen's kappa coefficient was computed for the remaining measures.
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Reliabilities for each measure are summarized in Table 1 . For the onset of the
familiarization, light test and dark trials, the times of contact and release with the toy
during the familiarization and light test trials, and the onset of the first reach during the
familiarization, light and dark trials, observers were considered to be in agreement if the
difference between their recorded times was less than 0.25 seconds. For the total amount
of time spent oriented toward the direction of the sound during the dark trials, scorers
were considered to be in agreement if the difference between their recorded times was
less than 0.50 seconds. Disagreements between the two observers as to whether an infant
reached (N=15), whether a reach ended in contact with the toy (N=l) and whether the
infant accidentally contacted the toy during the dark trials (N=4) were settled by a third
naive observer. For all additional measures, the judgements of the first observer were
used.
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Table 1. Inter-Observer Reliability
'^^^^"'"^ Criterion for agreement Reliability
Light trials
'^"al onset ± 0.25 seconds 99 54%
(familiarization and light Pearson r 1 qo
test trials combined)
Time of contact with toy ± 0.25 seconds 93.69%
Pearson r 0.99
Time of release of toy ± 0.25 seconds 93.69%
Pearson r 1.00
Dark trials
Trial onset ± 0.25 seconds 94.53%
Pearson r 1 .00
Trials during which at yes/no 96.09%
least one reach occurred Cohen's kappa 0.90
Onset of first reach ± 0.25 seconds 95.85%
(light and dark trials combined) Pearson r 1 .00
Number of reaches per trial total agreement 92.92%
Pearson r 0.89
Sector in which reach ended total agreement 95.43%
Cohen's kappa 0.94
Contact with toy yes/no 98.48%
(including all accidental contacts) Cohen's kappa 0.95
Direction of first head turn yes/no 95.70%
Cohen's Kappa 0.91
Amount of time spent oriented ± 0.50 seconds 88.89%
toward sound of toy Pearson r 0.99
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS
The current study sought to examine whether infants can learn to associate a
novel sound with a graspable object and then utilize this association to represent the
object when it is no longer visible. Participants were randomly assigned to either a
silent-object or a sound-experience group and were given the opportunity to reach for and
manually explore a toy in the light. The sole difference between these two groups was
that the toy produced a doorbell sound when infants in the sound-experience group, but
not the silent-object group, manipulated it. Following their respective light experiences,
infants in both groups were presented with the doorbell sound in the dark. The amount of
time spent in contact with the toy in the light, the number, direction, success, and latency
of the reaches that were produced in the dark, the direction of the first head turns upon
being presented with the doorbell sound in the dark, and the amount of time spent
oriented toward that sound were coded for each infant.
A summary of infants' behaviors during the familiarization, light test and dark
trials is presented in Table 2. As this table indicates, infants in the silent-object group
underwent 139 light trials and 128 dark trials, while infants in the sound-experience
group underwent a total of 141 light trials and 128 dark trials. During the light test trials,
4 infants (3 from the silent-object group and 1 from the sound-experience group) took
longer than 15 seconds to reach for the toy on one light trial each. The mean latency of
these 4 reaches was 24.01 seconds from the presentation of the toy. Furthermore, one
infant who was in the silent-object, order 1 group did not reach during any of the dark
trials; all other infants reached during at least one dark trial.
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Table 2. Summary of Behavior
Measure Silent-object group Sound-experience group
Light trials
Number of trials
familiarization trials
light test trials
Number of light trials during which
infants reached
68 trials
71 trials
138 trials (97.87%)
74 trials
67 trials
136 trials (96.45%)
Mean latency to reach during:
familiarization trials
light test trials
Mean amount of time spent in
contact with the toy during:
familiarization trials
light test trials
1 .35 seconds
(SD=1.25)
1 .94 seconds
(SD=3.03)
21.53 seconds
(SD=3.79)
19.06 seconds
(SD=4.01)
1.46 seconds
(SD=2.27)
1.93 seconds
(SD=2.91)
20.90 seconds
(SD=2.23)
19.76 seconds
(SD=2.93)
Dark trials
Number of trials
Number of accidental contacts
128 trials
7 contacts
128 trials
7 contacts
Number of dark trials during which
infants reached
excluding all trials following
an accidental contact
How far into the session infants
produced their first reaches
48 trials (37.50%)
(M=3.00, SD=2.13)
43 trials (33.59%)
(M=2.50, SD=1.79)
3.47 trial (SD=2.53)
68 trials (53.13%)
(M=4.25,SD=1.77)
59 trials (46.09%)
(M=3.69,SD=1.96)
2.75 trial (SD=1.88)
Continued, next page.
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Table 2, continued
Number of reaches during dark trials
excluding reaches following
an accidental contact during
a given trial
excluding all trials following
an accidental contact
Mean number of reaches per trial
Direction of reaches
Reaches ending in contact with the toy
number of trials
number of reaches
mean proportion of reaches
Reaches terminated in the correct
sectors
number of trials
number of reaches
mean proportion of reaches
Reaches terminated in the correct
hemifield
number of trials
number of reaches
mean proportion of reaches
Mean latency to reach
92 reaches
(M=5.75, SD=4.88)
88 reaches
(M=5.50, SD=4.58)
75 reaches
(M=4.69,SD=4.11)
1 14 reaches
(M=7.13,SD=4.11)
106 reaches
(M=6.63, SD=3.30)
87 reaches
(M=5.44, SD=3.50)
1
.65 reaches (SD=0.55) 1 .67 reaches (SD=0.67)
51 to the left (55.43%)
(M=3.73, SD=2.76)
58 to the left (50.88%)
(M=3.63, SD=2.66)
41 to the right (44.57%) 56 to the right (49.13%)
(M=2.40, SD=3.09) (M=3.50,SD=3.01)
1 1 trials (22.92%)
12 reaches (13.04%)
0.19(SD=0.28)
34 trials (70.83%)
47 reaches (51.09%)
0.65 (SD=0.28)
37 trials (77.08%)
51 reaches (55.43%)
0.68 (SD=0.24)
6.88 seconds
(SD=3.24)
16 trials (23.53%)
19 reaches (16.67%)
0.14(SD=0.18)
42 trials (61.76%)
54 reaches (47.37%)
0.52 (SD=0.26)
51 trials (75.00%)
67 reaches (58.77%)
0.61 (SD=0.24)
7.40 seconds
(SD=3.38)
Dark trials during which infants
first head turn was toward the toy
number of trials
Mean proportion of trials
Mean amount of time spent
oriented toward the sounding toy
during dark trials
92 trials (81.42%)
0.81 (SD=0.13)
7.38 seconds
(SD=1.45)
82 trials (71.30%)
0.72 (SD=0.15)
7.14 seconds
(SD=1.70)
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A Group (silent-object versus sound-experience) x Order (order 1 versus order 2)
X Trial type (familiarization versus light test trials) Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was
conducted on the mean amount of time infants spent in contact with the toy during the
light trials as well as their mean latency to reach for the toy during these trials. The
results of these analyses are presented in Table 3.
Table 3. ANOVAs for Light Trials
Measure Source df F
Mean amount or time Between subjects
spent in contact with Group (G) 1 0.002 0.97
the toy Order (0) 1 1.28 0.27
GxO 1 0.39 0.54
Error 28 (12.75)
Within subjects
Trial type (T) 1 5.37 0.03
TxG 1 0.74 0.40
TxO 1 0.27 0.61
TxGXO 1 0.83 0.37
Error 28 (9.68)
Mean latency to reach Between Subjects
for the toy Group (G) 1 0.01 0.94
Order (0) 1 0.31 0.58
GxO 1 0.0002 0.99
Error 28 (8.65)
Within Subjects
Trial type (T) 1 1.16 0.29
TxG 1 0.02 0.90
TxO 1 1.21 0.28
TxGXO 1 1.97 0.17
Error 28 (3.86)
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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As Table 3 indicates, there was a significant main effect of trial type with regard
to the amount of time spent in contact with the toy, F(l,28)=5.37,
e=0.03. Infants spent
an average of 21.21 seconds (SD=3.08) in contact with the toy during the familiarization
trials and 19.41 seconds (SD=3.47) during the light test trials respectively. This effect is
not surprising since the light test trials occurred later in the testing session than the
familiarization trials and thus can be explained by fatigue and/or eventual boredom with
the toy. More importantly, however, infants in both groups spent similar amounts of time
contacting and manipulating the toy and they had similar latencies to reach for the toy
during the light trials.
In order to examine infants' reaching behavior during the dark trials, each infant
was assigned a score ranging from 0 to 8 that represented the number of dark trials during
which s/he made at least one reach. In addition to this measure, the mean latency to
reach, the total number of reaches made, and the number of reaches per trial also were
computed for each infant. Finally, each infant was assigned a score ranging from 1 to 8
that represented the dark trial during which the infant produced his/her very first reach,
with low numbers indicating reaches occurring early in the session. A Group (silent-
object versus sound-experience) x Order (order 1 versus order 2) ANOVA was conducted
on each of these measures and the results are presented in Table 4. The one infant from
the silent-object, order 1 group who did not produce any reaches during the dark trials
was excluded from the analyses examining the mean latency to reach and how far into
the session each infant produced his/her first reach in the dark.
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Table 4. ANOVAs for Reaches During Dark Trials
Measure Source df F E
Mean latency to reach Group (G) 1 0.22
Order (0) 1 0.86 0.36
GxO 1 0.004 0.95
Error 21 (11.40)
Number of trials when Group (G) 1 3.05 0 09
infants produced at least Order (0) 1 0.03 0.86
one reach GxO 1 0.03 0.86
Error 28 (4.09)
Number of trials when Group (G) 1 6.25 0.02
infants produced at least Order (0) 1 0.13 0.72
one reach (excluding GxO 1 0.56 0.46
outlier) Error 27 (3.19)
Number of trials when Group (G) 1 3.13 0.09
infants produced at least Order (0) 1 1.05 0.31
one reach (excluding all GxO 1 0.22 0.65
trials following an Error 28 (3.60)
aCClUClUal LUIlldClj
Number of reaches Group (G) 1 0.72 0.40
Order (0) 1 0.29 0.59
GxO 1 0.72 0.40
Error 2o (21.05)
Number of reaches Group (G) 1 0.61 0.44
excluding all reaches Order (0) 1 0.07 0.80
following an accidental GxO 1 0.92 0.35
coniaci aunng d given iridi Error
Number of reaches Group (G) 1 0.31 0.58
excluding all trials Order (0) 1 0.85 0.36
following an accidental GxO 1 1.03 0.32
Error 28 (14.63)
Number of reaches Group (G) 1 0.02 0.90
per trial Order (0) 1 0.45 0.51
GxO 1 3.28 0.08
Error 28 (0.35)
Continued, next page.
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Table 4, continued
How far into session
infants produced their
first reach
Group (G)
Order (O)
GxO
Error
0.85
0.21
0.59
(5.14)
0.37
0.65
0.45
27
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
Although infants in the sound-experience group did reach on more trials than
infants in the silent-object group (M=4.25, SD=1.77 versus M=3.69, SD=1.96), this
difference was not significant (see Table 4). Upon closer examination of these data and
in the course of performing the above analyses, however, the SYSTAT 8.0 statistical
software package used to analyze the data detected an outlier; while scores for the infants
in both the silent-object and sound-experience groups generally ranged from 0 to 6 trials,
there was one infant in the silent-object group who reached on every dark trial and thus
had a score of 8 trials. When this outlier was eliminated, the mean number of trials
during which infants in the silent-object group reached was 2.67 trials (SD=1.72) (i.e.
31.25% of the dark trials) and the difference between the silent-object group and the
sound-experience group on this measure was significant, F(l,27)=6.25, p=0.02.
While there was a tendency for infants in the sound-experience group to reach
during more trials than infants in the silent-object group, it is important to keep in mind
that during several trials, 8 infants (5 from the silent-object and 3 from the sound-
experience group) accidentally contacted the toy. These accidental contacts may have
signaled to these infants that there was a graspable object available during the dark trials.
Because of this, all reaches following an accidental contact during a given trial were
eliminated and the total number of reaches produced by each infant during the dark trials
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was recalculated (see Table 2). Furthermore, since it is possible that infants' memories
of accidentally contacting an object in the dark may have carried over to subsequent
trials, all trials following a trial during which an accidental contact occurred were
excluded and an additional measure of the number of dark trials during which infants
reached, as well as the total number of reaches made, was obtained (see Table 2). A
Group (silent-object versus sound-experience) x Order (order 1 versus order 2) ANOVA
was conducted on each of these three new measures and these results also are presented
in Table 4. While in the expected direction, the differences between the two groups with
regard to these new measures also were not significant.
Although the differences between the silent-object and sound-experience groups
with regard to the total number of reaches, the number of reaches per trial and how far
into the testing session each infant produced his/her first reach in the dark were not
significant, it is important to note that these differences were in the expected direction in
every case. Infants in the sound-experience group made more reaches and produced their
very first reach in the dark earlier in the testing session than infants in the silent-object
group (see Table 2).
In order to examine the success of infants' reaches during the dark test trials, the
number of trials during which at least one reach resulted in contact with the toy, as well
as the number of trials during which at least one reach terminated in the two sectors
surrounding the toy and the number of trials during which at least one reach terminated in
the correct hemifield, was calculated for each infant. In addition, the proportion of
reaches that resulted in contact with the toy, as well as the proportion of reaches that
terminated in the two sectors surrounding the toy and the proportion of reaches that
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terminated in correct hemifield, was calculated for each infant. As previously mentioned,
a template was created that divided infants' reaching space into a 180° semi-circle. This
semi-circle was further divided into 6, 30° sectors, with the infants' mid-line serving as
the 90° mark. Since the toy was presented directly on the line between the 2 sectors
furthest from the center, reaches that terminated in either of these two sectors were
considered to be successful in so far as they came close to the toy without actually
contacting it. Combined, the arc of these two sectors measured approximately 16.76 cm,
with the toy occupying 7.5 cm of that space.
A Group (silent-object versus sound-experience) x Order (order 1 versus order 2)
ANOVA was conducted on each of the above measures of success and the results are
presented in Table 5. The one infant from the silent object, order 1 group who did not
reach at all during the dark trials was excluded from each of these analyses. While the
differences between the silent-object and sound-experience groups were in the expected
direction, with infants in the sound-experience group reaching into the correct sectors and
hemifield and contacting the toy more often than infants in the silent-object group (see
Table 2), these differences were not significant (see Table 5).
In addition to the above measures, the total number of reaches directed to the left
and to the right also was computed for each infant. A Group (silent-object versus sound-
experience) X Order (order 1 versus order 2) x Direction (left versus right) ANOVA was
conducted on these data and these results also are presented in Table 5. Once again, this
analysis excludes the one infant from the silent-object, order 1 group who did not reach at
all during the dark trials. As table 5 indicates, there were no significant effects or
interactions with regard to the direction of infants' reaches.
56
Table 5. ANOVAs for Success in Reaching During Dark Trials
Test Source df
E
Number of trials with Group (G) 1 0.39 0.54
at least one reach Order (0) 1 0.87 0.36
resulting in contact with GxO 1 0.10 0.76
the toy Error 27 n 25^
Number of trials with Group (G) 1 0.41 0.53
at least one reach Order (0) 1 1.11 0.30
terminating in the GxO 1 0.32 0.57
correct sectors Error 27 (2 01)
Number of trials with Group (G) 1 1.47 0.24
at least one reach Order (0) 1 0.52 0.48
terminating in the GxO 1 0.01 0.94
correct hemifield Error 27 (2.62)
Proportion of reaches Group (G) 1 0.31 0.58
resulting in contact Order (0) 1 0.04 0.85
with the toy GxO 1 1.06 0.31
Error 27 (0.06)
Proportion of reaches Group (G) 1 1.93 0.18
terminating in the correct Order (0) 1 0.13 0.72
sectors GxO 1 1.79 0.19
Error 27 fO 07)
Proportion of reaches Group (G) 1 0.69 0.42
terminating in the correct Order (0) 1 0.52 0.48
hemifield GxO 1 1.99 0.17
Error 27 (0.05)
Direction of reaches Group (G) 1 0.36 0.55
Order (0) 1 0.60 0.44
GxO 1 0.36 0.55
Error 27 (10.28)
Within Subjects
Direction (D) 11 1 HQ
DxG 1 0.74 0.40
DxO 1 0.65 0.43
Dx. GxO 1 0.44 0.80
Error 27 (6.78)
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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Finally, in order to determine whether infants were able to localize the doorbell
sound during the dark trials, the proportion of trials during which infants' first head turns
were away from mid-line and toward the doorbell sound was computed for each infant.
The mean proportion was 0.77 (SD=0.15), which was significantly different from chance
(i.e. 0.50), t(31)=10.10, p<0.001. In addition to this, the mean amount of time each
infant spent oriented toward the sounding toy was computed. A Group (silent-object
versus sound-experience) x Order (order 1 versus order 2) ANOVA was conducted on
these data and the results are presented in Table 6. As this table indicates, there were no
significant main effects or interactions with regard to either of these measures.
Table 6. ANOVAs for Head Orientation During Dark Trials
Test Source df F E
Proportion of trials during Group (G) 1 3.17 0.09
Which first head turn was Order (0) 1 0.18 0.68
Toward the sounding toy GxO 1 2.47 0.13
Error 28 (0.02)
Mean amount of time spent Group (G) 1 0.18 0.68
Oriented toward the Order (0) 1 0.33 0.57
Sounding toy GxO 1 1.30 0.26
Error 28 (2.53)
Note. Values enclosed in parentheses represent mean square errors.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
As mentioned, the primary purpose of the current study was to mvestigate the role
of representations in infants' reaching in the dark toward unseen, sounding objects.
Recent studies examining this matter have found that when given the opportunity to first
reach for and manipulate sounding objects in the light, 6 V2 month old infants will reach
at consistently high rates toward these same sounding objects in the dark (e.g. Perris &
Clifton, 1988; Clifton, Rochat, et al., 1991; McCall & Clifton, 1998, etc.). Based on
these results, some researchers have concluded that infants as young as 6 Vi months can
form associations between objects and sounds. More importantly, they conclude that
infants rely on these representations to guide their reaching behavior in the dark when
these objects can only be heard, but not seen (Clifton, 1998).
Because they challenge the Piagetian claim that infants are not able to represent
unseen objects until they have achieved object permanence at 8-10 months of age, the
conclusions drawn from the reaching in the dark literature have been scrutinized. One
challenge to the conclusions drawn from this line of research comes from studies
suggesting that infants will reach for sounds that they have not had the opportunity to
associate with graspable objects (Stack et al, 1989; Clifton, Perris, & McCall, 1999).
Equally problematic is the suggestion that by allowing infants to reach for sounding
objects in the light, researchers have classically conditioned them to reach toward these
sounds in the dark (Clifton, Rochat, et al., 1991; Clifton, 1998). Taken together, these
two points call into question the conclusions drawn from the reaching in the dark
literature regarding young infants' abilities to form and utilize representations.
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The current study sought to examine the question of whether young infants can
form and utilize representations to guide their behavior by controlHng for the two
problems just described. Infants were divided into two groups, a silent-object and a
sound-experience group, and were allowed to reach for a toy during several
familiarization trials in the light. For infants in the silent-object group, the toy remained
completely silent during these trials, while for infants in the sound-experience group, the
toy began to produce a doorbell sound only after these infants had reached for and
obtained the toy. Following their respective light experiences, infants in both groups
were presented with the doorbell sound in the dark and their reaching behavior was
observed.
Reaching for Sounds
As just mentioned, one challenge posed to the reaching in the dark literature
involves several studies demonstrating infants' willingness to reach for sounds in the
dark which they have not had the opportunity to associate with graspable objects. In two
studies by Stack et al. (1989) and Clifton, Ferris, & McCall (1999), infants consistently
reached toward rattle sounds in the dark without ever being shown the objects that
produced these sounds in the laboratory. In other words, it initially appeared as if infants
in these studies reached without any supposed "knowledge" of whether the source of
those sounds were graspable objects. Such behavior opened the door to the possibility
that in the traditional reaching in the dark studies (e.g. Ferris & Clifton, 1988; Clifton,
Rochat, et al., 1991; Clifton, Ferris, & Bullinger 1991; Litovsky & Clifton, 1992; etc.),
infants also reached for the sounds presented to them without any "knowledge", or
representation, of the objects producing those sounds.
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While the results of the studies by Stack et al. (1989) and Clifton, Perris, &
McCall (1999) suggested that infants will reach toward sounds in the dark regardless of
whether they have formed representations of the objects producing those sounds, the
current study sought to investigate a second, equally plausible explanation referred to as
the representation hypothesis. As pointed out previously. Stack et al. (1989) and Clifton,
Perris, & McCall (1999) presented infants with rattle sounds in the dark. It has been
suggested here that since rattles are fairly common baby toys in our society, it is more
than likely that most of the infants in these two studies had experience playing with
rattles prior to entering the laboratory. Based on this line of reasoning, it was
hypothesized that infants in the Stack et al. and Clifton, Perris, and McCall studies came
into the laboratory with a well-developed association between the rattle sounds and
rattles themselves as graspable objects. Consequently, rather than just reaching for the
sounds, the infants in these studies may have been reaching for a "graspable object" (i.e.
a rattle) based on these previously developed representations of rattles and the sounds
that they produce.
In order to investigate the hypothesis that infants will reach toward sounds in the
dark only when they have had the opportunity to develop an association between those
sounds and particular objects, infants in the current study were presented with an
electronic doorbell sound in the dark. It was reasoned that infants never would have had
the opportunity to associate this sound with a graspable object prior to entering the
laboratory. While infants in the sound-experience group were given the opportunity to
associate this sound with a particular toy in the light, infants in the silent-object group
were presented with this sound only in the dark. Infants in the silent-object group.
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therefore, should have had no knowledge, or representation, of the source of this sound
(i.e. whether it came from a graspable object).
Because infants in the silent-object group were not given the opportunity to
develop a representation of the toy associated with the doorbell sound, it was predicted
that they should reach very little toward this sound in the dark. The results of the current
study support this line of reasoning. Infants in the silent-object group reached on only
37.50% of the dark trials, a reaching rate in line with that obtained during piloting and
well below the 70-80% rate obtained in previous reaching in the dark studies using rattle
sounds (Perris & Clifton, 1988; Clifton, Rochat, et al., 1991; Clifton, Perris, & BuUinger
1991; Litovsky & Clifton, 1992; etc.).
It is interesting to note that in the current study, the rate of reaching for infants in
the silent-object group was similar to that obtained by Clifton, Perris, & Bullinger (1991).
As mentioned previously, infants in that study reached on only 3 1 % of the dark trials
during which they were presented with novel, computer-generated "pips" in the dark. It
was suggested earlier that infants in that study were not provided with enough experience
in the light to develop a representation of the object associated with those sounds. As a
result, when infants heard those unusual sounds in the dark, they may have reached
infrequently simply because they had no representation of the type of object (i.e.
graspable or not graspable) producing those sounds. The fact that infants in the silent-
object group of the current study also reached infrequently in the dark supports this
hypothesis. Taken together, these two studies suggest that infants who have not had the
opportunity to develop a well-formed association between a novel sound and a graspable
object will not reach frequently for that sound in the dark.
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In addition to the low rate of reaching predicted for infants in the silent-object
group, the representation hypothesis also predicted that infants who were given the
opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a graspable object (i.e. infants in the
sound-experience group) would reach in the dark more often than infants who had no
knowledge regarding the source of this sound (i.e. infants in the silent-object group). The
results of the current study marginally support this hypothesis: infants in the sound-
experience group reached during significantly more of the dark trials than infants in the
silent-object group when one outlier was eliminated. Furthermore, the fact that in the
silent-object group, infants' very first head turns upon hearing the doorbell sound in the
dark were toward that sound on 81 % of the trials suggests that their low rate of reaching
was not due to an inability to localize this sound. Taken together with the low frequency
rate of reaching in the silent-object group, this result supports the suggestion that the
opportunity to develop an association between a graspable object and its sound plays an
important role in infants' willingness to reach when presented with that sound in the
dark.
Additional Comparisons to Previous Studies
While infants in the sound-experience group did reach during more dark trials
than infants in the silent object group, it should be noted that the rate of reaching for
infants in the sound-experience group (i.e. 53.13%) was below the 70-80% rate obtained
in previous reaching in the dark studies employing the rattle sound (e.g. Perris & Clifton,
1988; Clifton, Rochat, et al., 1991; Clifton, Perris, & Bullinger 1991; Litovsky & Clifton,
1992; etc.). One possible explanation for this difference may be the positioning of the
toy in the dark. While within reaching distance, the sounding toy in the current study
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was presented at a greater distance from the infants (i.e. 32 cm) than in previous studies
(i.e. 15 cm) (e.g. Clifton, Perris, & Bullinger, 1991; Litovsky & Clifton, 1992, etc.). As
mentioned, this was done in order to prevent infants from accidentally contactmg the toy
in the dark. Perhaps this distance was a bit too far for infants to detect that the sounding
toy actually was within reaching distance. As studies by Clifton, Perris, & Bullinger
(1991) and Litovsky & Clifton (1992) have found, infants will not reach for sounding
objects that are placed beyond reaching distance. It is important to note, however, that in
these studies, "beyond reaching distance" was defined as 60 and 100 cm from the infant,
a far greater distance than the 32 cm used in the current study. As a result, while
possible, the suggestion that infants did not reach for the toy because they judged it to be
beyond reaching distance seems unlikely.
Beyond the possibility that the toy was placed too far from the infants in the
current study, a second more plausible explanation for the difference in reaching
frequency between the current study and previous reaching in the dark studies lies in
infants' relative experiences with the sounds used in these studies. It has been suggested
here that infants frequently reach toward rattle sounds in the dark based on their prior
experience with rattles at home. Undoubtedly, infants have had much more time to
explore and develop an association between rattles and their sounds at home than the few
short minutes that infants in the sound-experience group had to explore the novel,
doorbell sounding toy in the current study. It is possible that this difference in the
amount of time spent exploring these sounding toys is linked to the strength of the
representations formed, which in turn may have affected the frequency of reaching in the
dark for the rattle and doorbell sounds respectively.
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Beyond the lower frequency rate of reaching, the results of the current study also
differ from the traditional reaching in the dark studies with regard to the number of
reaches that ended close to or in contact with the toy in the dark. In previous reaching in
the dark studies, 60-92% of infants' reaches have come close to or ended in contact with
the target object (Perris & Clifton, 1988; Litovsky & Perris, 1992; Goubet & Clifton,
1998; Clifton, Perris, & McCall, 1999; etc.), while in the current study, only 47.37% of
infants' reaches came close to the toy (i.e. terminated in the two sectors surrounding the
toy) and only 16.67% ended in contact with it. This low success rate is especially
surprising given the large size of the toy used in this study (i.e. 12 x 7.5 x 1 1 cm)
compared to the smaller objects used in previous studies (e.g. 4 x 4 x 8 cm) (Perris &
Clifton, 1988). If infants in the sound-experience group of the current study were relying
on their representations of the sounding toy to guide their reaching in the dark, then their
reaches should have come close to and/or ended in contact with the toy as often as the
those of infants in previous reaching in the dark studies.
As was the case in explaining their lower reaching rate, it is possible that the
lower success rate of infants' reaches in the sound-experience group of the current study
versus those of infants in previous reaching in the dark studies was due to the distance of
the toy from the infants. In addition to extending their arms, infants in the current study
had to lean forward slightly with their torsos in order to successfully contact the toy
during the dark trials. Presenting the toy at a finger tip's distance from the infants
therefore may have prevented them from contacting it with their deliberate reaches.
A second factor that may have affected infants' success rates was the
localizability of the sound. While the fact that infants oriented toward the doorbell sound
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with their first head turns on 70-80% of the dark trials suggests that they had Httle trouble
localizing the approximate direction of this sound (i.e. to their right or left), pin-pointing
the exact location of the source of the doorbell sound in order to contact it may have been
more difficult than pin-pointing the source of the rattle sounds in previous studies.
Difficulty in determining the exact location of the sounding toy beyond left and right
therefore may have been an additional factor contributing to the surprisingly low success
rate of infants' reaches in the current study.
The Table
In piloting the current study, it was observed that the combination of the toy and
its implanted sound device was slightly too heavy for infants to comfortably manipulate
and explore it in mid-air without any support. As a result, infants in this study were
seated on their parents' laps at a comfortable reaching height and distance from a wooden
table. In both the light and the dark, the toy was presented to infants on this table. Once
they had reached for and obtained the toy, the table provided the additional support that
infants needed in order to manipulate and explore the toy easily.
It is important to note that the use of a table was a departure from the method of
toy presentation used in previous reaching in the dark studies (e.g. Perris & Clifton,
1988; Clifton, Rochat, et al., 1991; Clifton, Perris, & Bullinger 1991; Litovsky & Clifton,
1992; McCall & Clifton, 1998; Clifton, Perris & McCall, 1999; etc.). In each of these
studies, the toys always were presented at the end of a rod in mid-air and were light
enough that infants could manipulate them without any support. In short, this new
method of presentation may explain several of the differences uncovered between the
current study and previous reaching in the dark studies, as well as the lack of significant
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differences between the silent-object and sound-experience groups with regard to several
measures of their reaching behavior.
In addition to providing infants with the extra support necessary for them to
manipulate and explore the toy, the table itself served as an unforeseeable source of
distraction. During the light trials, infants often played with the toy by banging it against
the table-top. Furthermore, in both the light and the dark, infants often tactually explored
the surface of the table by sliding their hands across its surface and/or patting and tapping
it. This was especially true during the dark trials, when infants had nothing to look at and
little else beyond the doorbell sound to capture their attention. Because patting, tapping
and sliding one's hands on a table often involve actions which look identical to general
reaching behavior (i.e. extension of the arm(s) in a forward motion, an increase in the
angle between the shoulder and the forearm, etc.), the frequency of these behaviors
during the dark trials severely complicated the scoring of infants' reaches. While
detailed definitions and criteria were created in an attempt to distinguish infants' interest
in and exploration of the table from deliberate reaches for the toy, scoring of the data in
the current study was extremely conservative so as not to infer the intentions of the
infants (i.e. to reach for the toy or to explore the table). As a result, many actions that
simply may have been the result of infants' exploration of the table were in fact coded as
reaches.
Since infants' table-directed behaviors often were scored as reaches, the number
of trials during which infants reached, as well as their total number of reaches, was most-
likely overestimated by observers. As a result, the frequency of reaching for the
sounding toy in the current study may actually be lower for both the silent-object and
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sound-experience groups than that reported here. This inflation in the reaching rate as a
result of scoring may be one reason why the percentage of reaches that ended close to or
in contact with the toy in the current study was so low when compared to previous
reaching in the dark studies. As pointed out, since the toy used in the current study was
larger than the toys used in previous studies, one would expect infants to be more, not
less, successful in obtaining the toy when reaching for it. If, however, a substantial
number of the reported reaches were actually exploratory actions directed toward the
table and not the toy, then one would not expect as many of these actions/reaches to
come close to or contact the toy. The low success rate of infants' reaches in both groups
therefore may be explained by infants' interest in the table. The table may have become
the goal of their manual exploration and action rather than the toy.
In addition to providing an explanation for the low success rate of infants'
reaches, the use of a table in the current study also may explain why the differences
between these two groups with regard to the total number of reaches produced by infants
and the number of reaches per trial, while in the expected direction, did not reach
significance. If infants in the sound-experience group developed an association between
the doorbell sound and the toy based on their experience with it in the light, then these
infants should have used this information, or representations, to guide their reaching
behavior in the dark. Consequently, one would expect that when infants in this group
reached out and failed to contact the toy, they should have continued to reach and search
for it until they contacted it. At the same time, however, infants in the silent-object
group, who did not have the opportunity to associate the doorbell sound with a graspable
object, should have had no "knowledge" that the source of this sound was a graspable
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object. If infants' reaching in the dark toward sounding objects truly is guided by their
representations of the sources of those sounds, infants in the silent-object group should
have had no reason to believe that a graspable object existed in the dark. As a result,
when infants in this group reached out and failed to contact the toy (i.e. the source of the
sound), they should have had no reason to continue searching for it.
According to the above line of reasoning, infants in the sound-experience group
should have produced significantly more reaches in the dark than those in the silent-
object group. This is especially true considering the extremely low percentage of reaches
that ended in contact with the toy for infants in both groups. Obviously, infants were not
very successful in contacting the toy, therefore, one would have expected infants in the
sound-experience, but not the silent-object group, to continually search and reach for the
sounding object in the dark, thereby producing more reaches than infants in the silent-
object group. As the results of the current study indicate, this was not the case; infants in
the sound-experience group did not produce significantly more reaches in the dark than
infants in the silent-object group.
As previously mentioned, the use of the table in the current study may explain
why infants in the sound-experience group did not produce significantly more reaches
than those in the silent-object group. When infants in both the sound-experience and
silent-object groups reached in the dark, they consistently came into contact with an
object, that is, the table. While the table may not have been the "target object", for the
infants, it may have been sufficient to engage their interest. This especially would be the
case for the infants in the silent-object group, who should have had no "knowledge" of
the type of object that was producing the doorbell sound, and therefore, the type of
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object, if any, that they should have contacted. But what about the infants in the sound-
experience group? If they truly "knew" that the doorbell sound was produced by a
graspable object and reached out expecting to contact this object, then contacting the
table, which was not graspable/obtainable in the same manner as the toy, should not have
satisfied their expectations. Infants in this group should have continued to search for the
toy (i.e. the expected graspable object) and therefore still should have produced more
reaches than infants in silent-object group.
Why didn't infants in the sound-experience group reach significantly more often
in the dark than infants in the silent-object group? One possibility is that when infants in
this group contacted the table, the table itself distracted them from their primary goal of
reaching for and obtaining the sounding toy. Upon contacting the table, infants may have
found exploring this surface equally or more interesting than searching for the toy.
Infants in the sound-experience group thus may have failed to continue searching and
reaching for the sounding toy not because they did not know that a graspable object
existed, but rather, simply because they were distracted by their contact with the table.
More importantly, this may be why the difference between the sound-experience and
silent-object groups with regard to the total number of reaches produced per session and
the average number of reaches produced per trial, while in the expected directions, did
not reach significance.
Conditioning
While infants in the sound-experience group of the current study did not produce
significantly more reaches, these infants did reach during significantly more dark trials
than the infants in the silent-object group. This result supports the argument that infants
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reach for sounding objects in the dark based on their representations of those objects.
More importantly, however, by presenting infants in the sound-experience group with the
doorbell sound only after their reaches for the toy were completed, the design of the
current study eliminated the possibility that their reaches simply were the result of
classical, forward conditioning.
While eliminating the potential for the classical, forward conditioning of infants'
reaches, one might wonder whether the current design created the potential for backward
conditioning to occur. It may be argued that presenting infants in the sound-experience
group with the doorbell sound following the completion of their reaches for the toy set
the stage for the occurrence of backward conditioning. If correct, infants in the sound-
experience group of the current study may have reached during more of the dark trials
than infants in the silent-object group because they were conditioned to do so during the
familiarization trials in the light.
Could presenting infants with the doorbell sound (i.e. the conditioned stimulus)
following their reaches for the toy (i.e. the conditioned response) have led to the
backward conditioning of infants' reaching behavior? Several facts argue against this
hypothesis. First of all, there is relatively little evidence in the literature supporting the
reliability of backward conditioning (Shurtleff & Ayres, 1981; Albert & Ayres, 1997).
According to Albert & Ayres (1997), "excitatory backward and simultaneous
conditioning phenomena are not robust" (p. 210). Combined with the fact that the
overwhelming majority of research investigating backward conditioning comes from the
animal literature, the existence of this phenomenon in humans, and the conditions under
which it may occur, is speculative.
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In addition to the uncertainty surrounding backward conditioning and the
conditions under which it occurs, the design of the current study also casts doubt on the
suggestion that infants' reaches in the sound-experience group of the current study may
have been the result of backward conditioning. According to the standard definition of
backward conditioning, the conditioned stimulus follows the unconditioned stimulus,
which produces some change in behavior. In the current study, the doorbell sound (i.e.
the conditioned stimulus) followed infants' sight of the object (i.e. the unconditioned
stimulus), which led them to produce a reach for the toy (i.e. the unconditioned
response). In this case, the supposed conditioned stimulus was not presented until the
response to the unconditioned stimulus (i.e. the reach), and therefore, the eventual
conditioned response, was complete. The fact that the doorbell sound followed the
completion of the reach in the current study, and therefore the behavior to be conditioned,
thus makes the suggestion that infants' reaches in the current study may have been
conditioned highly improbable.
Conclusions
In summary, several results obtained in the current study provide evidence against
two of the greatest challenges facing the reaching in the dark literature, namely, that
infants will reach toward sounds in the dark even when they have not had the opportunity
to associate them with graspable objects and that infants' reaches in these studies may
have been the result of classical conditioning. In general, the fact that infants in the
silent-object group of the current study reached infrequently in the dark supports the
hypothesis that infants who have never had the opportunity to associate a novel sound
with a graspable object will not reach when presented with that sound in the dark. More
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importantly, the fact that infants in the sound-experience group reached during more dark
trials than those in the silent-object group suggests that the opportunity to form
representations of sounding objects does play a role in infants' reaching in the dark
toward unseen, sounding objects, as previous researchers have maintained (e.g. Perris &
Clifton, 1988; Clifton, Rochat, et al., 1991; McCall & Clifton, 1998; Clifton, 1998, etc.).
Finally, the fact that the design of the current study eliminated the potential for the
forward conditioning of infants' reaches also supports to the conclusion that when infants
reach for sounding objects in the dark, they do so based on their representations of those
objects and not simply because they have been conditioned to reach in response to the
sounds of those objects. In short, the results of the current study lend additional support
to the primary conclusion drawn from the reaching in the dark literature, namely, that
infants as young as 6 V2 months are able to form and utilize representations of unseen,
sounding objects.
Future Directions
While infants in the sound-experience group did reach on more dark trials than
infants in the silent-object group, the fact that this was the only significant difference
between these two groups cannot be ignored. Infants' in the sound-experience group did
not produce more reaches, nor were their reaches more successful than those of the
infants in the silent-object group. At the same time however, it is important to keep in
mind that while not significant, the differences between the silent-object and sound-
experience groups on these measures were in the predicted directions. As pointed out
previously, one of the major reasons why these differences may not have reached
significance was the use of the table in presenting the toy. It seems likely that running
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this study with toys presented in mid-air may produce the significant differences aimed
for here, thereby providing strong evidence supporting young infants' abilities to form
and utilize representations. At the very least, therefore, the current study provides a
promising design with which the role of representations in infants' reaching in the dark
toward unseen, sounding objects can be investigated in the future.
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